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CORPORATE PRIVACY FAILURES  
START AT THE TOP 
VICTORIA L. SCHWARTZ* 
Abstract: With the rise of big data, numerous corporations are in the privacy 
business. Yet even corporations not directly in the privacy business must also 
make important decisions potentially impacting the privacy of their employees, 
consumers, and shareholders. A wide consensus of scholars and commentators 
has agreed that corporations fail to adequately protect privacy. The existing 
scholarship has largely focused on demand-side market failures to explain this 
privacy failure phenomenon. This Article offers a supply-side market distortion 
theory that reinforces the existing demand-side explanations to better account for 
corporate privacy failures. Under this supply-side theory, extensive corporate 
disclosure requirements, including the real possibility of disclosure of personal 
information about corporate executives, as well as a legally protected interest by 
the media in the personal lives of corporate executives combine to cause the pool 
of corporate executive candidates to sort in favor of individuals who do not 
themselves highly value privacy. This sorting effect can prevent the corporation 
from being able to properly anticipate and respond to various privacy issues. 
Recognition of this Article’s supply-side market distortion theory allows a shift 
away from a singular view of the corporate privacy problem as a consumer-
driven market failure. This enables identifying counterbalancing steps that can 
help offset the corporate-side sorting effect such as allowing corporate executives 
to negotiate individualized disclosure policies, and adding chief privacy officers 
to conceptions of good corporate governance in order to ensure that there is 
someone in the corporate leadership tasked with raising privacy concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The corporate track record on privacy is troubling. There are countless 
examples of corporations neglecting to protect, failing to consider, or in some 
cases even intentionally violating the privacy of their consumers, employees, 
and even occasionally their shareholders. As a consequence, corporations have 
developed a well-earned reputation of inadequately protecting privacy. 
In recent years, numerous corporations have even been forced to issue 
apologies and explanations regarding their treatment of privacy in response to 
consumer outrage and backlash.1 This has prompted the question of why each 
corporation failed to correctly anticipate the privacy problem in the first case. 
Such companies as Yahoo and Google have repeatedly faced privacy lawsuits.2 
Famously, in 1999, Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy told reporters and 
analysts that their focus on consumer privacy issues is a “red herring.”3 “You 
have zero privacy anyway,” McNealy proclaimed, “[g]et over it.”4 
Furthermore, in an Internet-of-things world in which modern technology 
is rapidly being integrated into everyday objects, this corporate privacy failure 
phenomenon is not limited to dedicated technology companies. Traditional 
corporations have also found themselves facing scrutiny for failing to protect 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Reed Albergotti, Furor Erupts Over Facebook’s Experiment on Users, WALL STREET 
J. (June 30, 2014, 9:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/furor-erupts-over-facebook-experiment-on-
users-1404085840 [https://perma.cc/K6HD-2BCG] (reporting consumer outrage after Facebook 
invaded users’ privacy by conducting experiments that attempted to manipulate the users’ emotions); 
Tamara Chuang, Playing Pokemon Go? Here’s How to Stay Safe, DENVER POST (July 15, 2016, 4:56 
PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/15/pokemon-go-safety-online/ [https://perma.cc/NX8T-
JFA4] (reporting Niantic Inc.’s apology for Pokemon Go’s Google account access controversy and 
highlighting other privacy concerns with the hit app); Stephanie Mlot & Chloe Albanesius, Spotify 
CEO Apologizes for Privacy Policy Confusion, PC MAG. (Aug. 21, 2015, 11:05 AM), http://www.
pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2489855,00.asp [https://perma.cc/7ZLA-TGNV] (addressing consumer 
backlash over Spotify’s new privacy policy and the CEO’s subsequent apology); Notice of Data 
Breach, OMNI HOTELS & RESORTS (July 8, 2016), https://www.omnihotels.com/notice [https://perma.
cc/65FL-RA43] (apologizing for a breach of customer financial data and offering one free year of 
identity theft protector for affected guests); Keith Wagstaff, Uber Battles Privacy Concerns Over 
‘God View’ Tool, NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014, 10:51 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-
news/uber-battles-privacy-concerns-over-god-view-tool-n251691 [https://perma.cc/96DF-UCL8] 
(discussing consumer concern and company responses after Uber used tracking tools without users’ 
consent). 
 2 See, e.g., Sooraj Shah, Yahoo to Face Legal Action Over Email Spying, COMPUTING (May 28, 
2015), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2410386/yahoo-to-face-legal-action-over-email-spying 
[https://perma.cc/TM6X-Y23F]; David Streitfeld, Google to Pay $7M in Street View Privacy Case, 
BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/12/google-pay-million-
for-scooping-data-street-view-production/25ehHQyeAEkh6LaAIot5fM/story.html [https://perma.cc/
LRK9-MACJ]. 
 3 Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’ WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), http://archive.wired.
com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 [https://perma.cc/5NWE-NDLW]. 
 4 Id. 
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privacy. For example, the automobile industry has been under attack for failing 
to protect consumer privacy as it works to integrate modern technology into 
the automobile.5 Similar privacy concerns have arisen in the toy industry, 
where Mattel has received criticism for the privacy-invasive way it integrated 
modern voice-recognition technology into its “Hello Barbie” doll, causing the 
doll to be insultingly nicknamed the “Eavesdropping Barbie.”6  
One of the more newsworthy examples of corporate failures with regard 
to employee privacy involved AOL CEO Tim Armstrong violating the privacy 
of two of AOL’s employees in February 2014. While attempting to defend 
AOL’s decision to make changes to its retirement policies in a town-hall style 
meeting with employees, Armstrong revealed that AOL had two employees 
with “distressed babies” that cost the company one million dollars each in 
healthcare costs.7 Armstrong subsequently apologized.8 Although it isn’t clear 
whether Armstrong’s statements violated existing privacy laws such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),9 his 
statements suggested a disregard for the privacy of his employees and caused 
widespread outrage.10 
Although Armstrong’s comments made headlines, far more ordinary and 
unpublicized corporate workplace invasions of privacy occur every day. 
Corporations invade the privacy of their employees as the result of medical 
testing, drug testing, corporate wellness programs, personality testing, and 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See, e.g., Aaron M. Kessler, Report Sees Weak Security in Cars’ Wireless Systems, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/business/report-sees-weak-security-in-cars-wireless-
systems.html [https://perma.cc/78GA-3K5S]. 
 6 Sarah Halzack, Privacy Advocates Try to Keep ‘Creepy,’ ‘Eavesdropping’ Hello Barbie from 
Hitting Shelves, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2015/03/11/privacy-advocates-try-to-keep-creepy-eavesdropping-hello-barbie-from-hitting-shelves/ 
[https://perma.cc/B5FK-HSWL]. 
 7 Jia Lynn Yang, AOL Chief Cuts 401(k) Benefits, Blames Obamacare and Two “Distressed 
Babies,” WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/
02/06/aol-chief-cuts-401k-benefits-blames-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/5KVB-ET9Z]. Armstrong 
stated that “[w]e had two AOL-ers that had distressed babies that were born that we paid a million 
dollars each to make sure those babies were OK in general.” Id. Armstrong was attempting to justify a 
reduction in AOL’s 401(k) benefits by explaining that the company was incurring costs in other 
benefit areas. Id. 
 8 Michelle Miller, AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Apologizes for “Distressed Babies” Remarks, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014, 7:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-apologizes-
for-distressed-babies-remarks/ [https://perma.cc/F2JV-TAV9]. 
 9 Dan Munro, Did AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Violate HIPAA?, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2014, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2014/02/10/did-aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-violate-hipaa/#2125
ce9f6088 [https://web.archive.org/web/20151231002657/http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/
2014/02/10/did-aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-violate-hipaa/]. 
 10 See, e.g., id.; Natasha Singer, Revelations by AOL Boss Raise Fears Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/business/media/revelations-by-aol-boss-raise-
fears-over-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/6WLL-BGQG]. 
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workplace surveillance programs ranging from monitoring e-mail to GPS 
trackers. 
Even shareholders are not immune from the corporate privacy failure 
phenomenon. Original New York Stock Exchange member General Electric 
sent a supposedly anonymous survey to shareholders of its subsidiary GE 
Investments, asking the shareholders to rate different aspects of the company.11 
The shareholders were not informed that the return envelopes were coded such 
that the responses could be matched to names.12 By not asking shareholders to 
input their names and addresses, the company apparently hoped that, believing 
their responses were anonymous, the shareholders would agree to answer such 
personal questions as what percentage of their investments was managed by 
the company.13 
These sorts of privacy failure stories are neither unusual nor new. Over 
two decades ago, in his study of corporate privacy practices, management 
scholar H. Jeff Smith recounted some of the more notable corporate privacy 
problems of the 1990s.14 To put it bluntly, his conclusions were ugly. He found 
that corporate privacy practices received systematic inattention and a lack of 
resources. Privacy policies largely didn’t exist at all, and if they did, they were 
often ignored. Smith found that organizations he studied tended to be reactive 
on privacy issues, and concluded that “most executives wait until an external 
threat forces them to consider their privacy policies.”15 
In light of this track record, it is unsurprising that scholars have not been 
impressed with corporate treatment of privacy. One scholar noted, “[L]eaving 
privacy controls in individual companies’ hands has proven to be a 
longstanding fox-in-the-henhouse type failure.”16 A second scholar concurred, 
“[C]orporate America and Fortune 500 companies . . . view personal 
information as a commodity and believe that it is their corporate right to 
exploit and manipulate personal information as they see fit.”17 
The existing scholarly explanations for this descriptive claim regarding 
the inadequacies of corporate treatment of privacy can be broadly categorized 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Survey Says: You’re Not Anonymous, WASH. POST (June 9, 1999), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1999/06/09/survey-says-youre-not-anonymous/e2b27c03-
f0fb-457d-bd76-5398d2df6ded/ [https://perma.cc/63T8-LMFY]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE 
AMERICA 1–14  (1994); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books 
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 249 (2011) (discussing Smith’s findings). 
 15 SMITH, supra note 14, at 93.  
 16 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday Life, 
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 106 (2012). 
 17 Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-Imagination of 
Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 138 (2006). 
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within two demand-side consumer-centric camps. First, one group of scholars 
concludes that corporations do not care about privacy because consumers do 
not care about privacy, or at least do not care about privacy as much as other 
priorities.18 For this camp, there is not a real privacy problem; corporations 
aren’t protecting privacy because privacy isn’t something that consumers have 
decided needs protection. For the second group of scholars, corporations do 
not care about privacy because there is some sort of market failure in which 
consumers who do care about privacy are unable to make choices to express 
that preference in the market.19 For this group, the demand-side privacy market 
failure likely requires legal intervention to correct for that failure. 
This Article adds an additional supply-side corporate market distortion 
theory to supplement the prevailing demand-side accounts explaining why 
corporations inadequately consider and protect privacy. This theory posits that 
as a result of various systemic legal and societal failures to protect the personal 
privacy of high-level corporate executives, individuals who place a high value 
on their own privacy are less likely to pursue high-level executive positions at 
publicly traded corporations. As a result of this sorting effect, those remaining 
candidates who do pursue the high-level corporate executive positions are, on 
the whole, less likely to highly value their own privacy. This reduced personal 
privacy preference may cause corporate executives to undervalue or not even 
recognize the privacy implications of their business decisions.  This is more 
likely when the privacy issue is not squarely presented, but arises in a 
seemingly innocuous product design decision. Nevertheless, these low-privacy 
preference individuals are responsible for making important corporate privacy 
decisions, as well as setting the tone for lower-level decisionmakers regarding 
what values the corporation ought to prioritize. As such, the individual privacy 
preferences of senior-level corporate executives can impact corporate behavior 
on privacy issues. Recognizing this supply-side story does not undermine or 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 181 (2000) (“Most people don’t care about privacy until they have something to hide, and 
there’s no reason to believe that consumers wouldn’t voluntarily transfer property rights in their 
personal data to commercial Web sites in exchange for product discounts and other conveniences.”); 
Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1412 (2011) (listing 
possible reasons for a low demand in products and services with strong privacy safeguards including 
consumers not caring very much about privacy). 
 19 See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 16, at 106–07 (noting that there is a corporate privacy-market 
failure because the transaction costs of privacy have been placed on consumers); Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Privacy, The Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2013) (noting the impossibility of 
expecting consumers to read large numbers of privacy policies); Peek, supra note 17, at 164 
(identifying a corporate privacy-market failure resulting from the fallacy of consumer choice because 
consumers must consent to a privacy policy or not do business with an entire industry); Rubinstein, 
supra note 18, at 1432 (noting the market failure within the privacy market resulting from information 
asymmetries). 
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replace, but rather supplements and demonstrates the salience of the demand-
side privacy problems. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the systemic studies, 
academic scholarship, and real-world examples demonstrating the widespread 
failure on the part of corporations to protect privacy.20 It then addresses the 
existing consumer-centric explanations scholars have offered to account for 
these privacy failures.21 Part II presents the additional supply-side corporate 
market-distortion hypothesis as an additional theory for why corporations fail 
to adequately protect privacy.22 This Part identifies the features of the legal 
system and society more generally that cause a sorting effect by which 
individuals who care about privacy do not choose to become corporate 
executives.23 It then explores the implications of that sorting on corporate 
privacy decision making.24 Part III offers some corporate-side solutions that 
would help counter the corporation-side cause of the privacy problem such as 
allowing corporate executives to negotiate disclosure policies covering the 
corporate disclosure of their personal information and adopting chief privacy 
officers (“CPOs”) as a part of good corporate governance.25 This Article then 
concludes by setting out a roadmap for future empirical work that can test the 
some of the assumptions in the theoretical hypothesis offered in this Article. 
I. SYSTEMATIC CORPORATE PRIVACY FAILURES 
For decades, scholars and commentators have agreed that corporations do 
not adequately prioritize privacy.26 This consensus is reinforced by numerous 
examples and studies of corporations failing to adequately protect, neglecting 
to recognize, and even intentionally invading the privacy of their corporate 
constituents.  Although big data and technology advancements have changed 
the ease and frequency with which this corporate privacy failure phenomenon 
occurs, the corporate privacy failures themselves are not new. Corporations 
have consistently demonstrated that they do not prioritize privacy.27 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 26–89 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 90–126 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 127–255 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 140–193 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 194–255 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 256–295 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
 27 Corporations do at times care about their own corporate privacy to the extent that such a thing 
exists, but that is a conceptually different concept. For more about corporate privacy, see generally 
Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27 (2014). 
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A. Scholars Recognize the Corporate Privacy Failure 
A strong consensus has developed that corporations do not make privacy 
a priority. As Marcy Peek describes, “[I]t is the entirety of corporate America 
and Fortune 500 companies that view personal information as a commodity 
and believe that it is their corporate right to exploit and manipulate personal 
information as they see fit.”28 Prominent sociologist Amitai Etzioni agrees 
with this view of corporations as a privacy threat, and that as a result, “[I]t is 
no longer possible to protect privacy by only curbing the State.”29 Similarly, 
Avidan Cover writes about the dangers of a system that relies on corporations 
to assert privacy rights against the government.30 As Joshua Fairfield 
eloquently puts it, “[L]eaving privacy controls in individual companies’ hands 
has proven to be a longstanding fox-in-the-henhouse type failure.”31 
Scholars have recognized this corporate privacy failure in a wide variety 
of industries and contexts. For example, Katrin Byford explains that the realm 
of cyberspace has the potential “to have distinct Orwellian overtones—with 
the notable difference that the primary threat to privacy comes not from 
government, but rather from the corporate world.”32 Similarly, Derek Witte 
discusses the problems associated with data mining and sharing in the context 
of large Internet companies.33 He warns: 
Citizens who value privacy should be nervous, for the companies 
that want to store personal data on their “big iron” and simply allow 
users to visit the documents they create, spreadsheets they build, and 
books they buy are the same companies that force customers to 
agree to terms of service that will give these giant corporations a 
right to read, use, and pilfer customer data for value.34 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Peek, supra note 17, at 138. 
 29 Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 
950–51 (2012). 
 30 Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2015). 
 31 Fairfield, supra note 16, at 106. 
 32 Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the 
Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 50 (1998). 
 33 Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a World of 
Digital Sharing and Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 729 (2013). 
 34 Id.; see also Derek S. Witte, Privacy Deleted: Is It Too Late to Protect Our Privacy Online?, J. 
INTERNET L., Jan. 2014, at 1, 17 (“Google reached a compromise with the FTC under . . . threat of an 
enforcement action. As a result, Google revised its privacy policy . . . . The synthesized policy, 
however, revealed that Google had no interest in maintaining consumer privacy.”). 
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More generally, Daniel Solove has described the privacy harms that occur at 
the hands of corporations who gather large amounts of consumer data.35 
Solove describes the “thoughtless and irresponsible ways that bureaucracies 
use personal information and their lack of accountability in using and 
protecting the data.”36 In addition to the inadequate formal privacy policies, 
Solove also criticizes the “irresponsible and careless uses of personal 
information” and the “complete lack of care and accountability by the 
corporations collecting the data.”37 These scholars are just a few examples of 
the various voices agreeing that corporations do not prioritize privacy.38 There 
is a notable absence of scholarly voices arguing otherwise.39 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424–30 (2001). 
 36 Id. at 1428. 
 37 Id. at 1428–29. 
 38 See Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information 
from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1485–86 (2001) 
(describing a phenomenon whereby “commercial interests have collected massive amounts of 
information about individuals which is used readily to encroach on consumer privacy. The wide 
dissemination of such information and purchasing habits has harmed consumers by creating an 
environment susceptible to identity theft and unauthorized charges. There is also a growing perception 
that the financial market is less secure and that partnerships between financial institutions and 
telemarketers may destabilize the financial industry.”); Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human 
Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 345, 348 
(1995) (“[E]mployees must rely on employer self-regulation to protect their privacy interests. This 
solution is unacceptable because employers often believe they have significant incentives to 
marginalize the protection of employee privacy. Consequently, American businesses have largely 
failed to revise their in-house privacy policies despite their increasing use of electronic monitoring. 
This enlarging gap between employee privacy interests and employer monitoring policies is 
undoubtedly reflected in the marked increase in employee suits alleging invasion of privacy by 
employers.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private 
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 498 (1995) (describing the business community’s attempts at 
developing “appropriate business practices for self-regulation” of the treatment of personal 
information as having “broken down”). See generally Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business 
Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 77 (1996) (arguing that “businesses have an interest in being informed about individuals because of 
the strategic importance of that information” as a means of attempting to control decisions those 
individuals make as citizens, consumers, and employees). 
 39 At most, some scholars have demonstrated that corporations increasingly recognize that there 
can be public relations reasons to at least appear to care about privacy. See, e.g., Nicole A. Ozer, 
Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating Corporate 
Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 239–40 (2012) (pointing out that “many companies 
are taking steps to demonstrate that they value user privacy, including backtracking from changes that 
generate significant public protest. . . . In fact, online privacy has become such a central issue in the 
business world that Facebook hired a public relations firm to pitch stories critical of its competitor, 
Google, in order to shift the spotlight away from Facebook’s privacy issues”). It is certainly possible, 
however, that assuming an optimal level of privacy and that corporations can either over-protect or 
under-protect privacy relative to that baseline optimal level, that it only makes the news when 
corporations under-protect privacy and not when they over-protect. If that were true, however, one 
would think that corporations would have incentives to better publicize that fact in some way. 
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B. Studies Documenting Corporate Privacy Problems 
The scholarly consensus regarding corporate privacy problems has been 
reinforced by studies systematically documenting the corporate treatment of 
privacy. In a 1993 study, Smith investigated corporate privacy practices.  He 
interviewed executives, managers, and employees of the studied companies, 
conducted written surveys of employees, and spoke with privacy and consumer 
advocates and industry observers.40 Smith cataloged extensive problems with 
corporate privacy. He found that corporations systematically lacked privacy 
policies, and where such policies existed, they were typically ignored.41 Smith 
discovered that the organizations that he studied were reactive with regard to 
privacy issues, and that “most executives wait until an external threat forces 
them to consider their privacy policies.”42 He determined that all the various 
companies followed a similar approach to the process of privacy policy-
making, an approach that he described as “a wandering and reactive one.”43 
Specifically, Smith described high-profile examples of corporate privacy 
failures of that era. For instance, Blockbuster video had planned to sell mailing 
lists of its customers.44 It only retracted the plan after a privacy backlash from 
its customers.45 Similarly, executives of Lotus Development Corporation and 
Equifax Marketing Decision Systems cancelled the release of a product that 
would have given information about American households to businesses for 
use in direct marketing.46 They backpedaled following negative press coverage 
and subsequent customer requests to be deleted from the database.47 
The banking industry examined at the time fared no better at protecting 
customer privacy. Smith found that two of the banks studied both had plans to 
collect extensive computerized information about their customers.48 The 
banks’ plan was to gather that data using both the forms customers submitted 
when they opened accounts as well as automation systems in which bank 
employees used casual conversations with customers to gather and then 
                                                                                                                           
 40 SMITH, supra note 14, at 15–17. 
 41 Id. at 4, 135–36. There are some sample bias reasons to think that the actual privacy practices 
at the time may be even worse than Smith’s study revealed. Companies were given the opportunity to 
opt-out of his study, and a number of companies did so. Id. at 51–54 (explaining the voluntary nature 
of the study and acknowledging that certain companies refused to participate). Logically, the 
companies who chose not to participate may have had even worse privacy policies than the companies 
who agreed to participate. 
 42 Id. at 93. 
 43 Id. at 55. 
 44 Id. at 2. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 102. 
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manually enter personal customer information such as the number of children, 
whether the home was rented or owned, and household income.49 The banks at 
the time had no privacy policies regarding this sort of collection of 
information.50 One bank executive explained that the goal was to “get any 
information you can from people and about people.”51 Another banking 
executive confessed: 
The truth is that almost any officer of the bank (especially, one with 
lending authority) can get at any information in the computer system 
. . . . I never promise my customers total privacy, because I know I 
cannot deliver it. A lot of them assume they are entering into a 
confidential arrangement, however, and I don’t tell them otherwise 
unless they ask.52 
The executive explained that ensuring more customer privacy would create an 
increased administrative burden.53 
More recently, Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan set out to 
update Smith’s “landmark” study of corporate privacy practices and his “grim” 
conclusions regarding “how corporations actually manage privacy and what 
motivates them,” or what they call “privacy on the ground.”54 Their published 
initial findings of their empirical research found a far different picture than 
Smith’s disastrous findings. Within the corporations they studied, they found a 
“shift” in the treatment of privacy.55 Their subsequent, more comprehensive 
book on corporate privacy behavior in the United States and Europe similarly 
found that the corporate management of privacy “has undergone a profound 
transformation.”56 
Despite these rosier findings, Bamberger and Mulligan’s research does 
not purport to suggest that corporate privacy problems have disappeared. This 
is because their self-described methodology involved qualitative interviews 
with CPOs who were “identified as industry leaders by their peers.”57 In other 
words, the sample was intentionally selected from the best in class with regard 
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to corporate treatment of privacy. Therefore, as they warn, the small sample 
and choice of identified industry leaders means that the conclusions that can be 
drawn “are necessarily limited” and “do not . . . provide evidence of corporate 
attitudes towards privacy more generally.”58 As discussed further subsequently, 
to the extent that any conclusions can be drawn from their sample, their study 
is actually consistent with the theory offered in this Article by demonstrating 
that the characteristics of those corporations that have more successful privacy 
reputations match those that would be predicted based on the supply-side 
market distortion hypothesis.59 
Studies have also found corporate privacy failures with employee privacy. 
A study of eighty-four Fortune 500 companies representing over 3.2 million 
employees conducted in 1995, for example, found that the companies studied 
failed to adequately protect employee information.60 The study found that 42% 
of corporations did not have a policy for conducting periodic evaluations of 
their personnel record-keeping systems, and had not designated an executive-
level individual to be responsible for maintaining privacy safeguards for 
employment record-keeping practices.61 Seventy-five percent of the companies 
surveyed answered that they routinely “check, verify, or supplement” 
information about their employees beyond what the employees voluntarily 
provided.62 Nearly half did not inform workers they were gathering the 
information.63 Similarly, a 2007 study of employer monitoring and surveillance 
practices found that employers use a variety of technological tools to routinely 
engage in monitoring and surveillance of employees.64 Computer monitoring 
took many forms, with 45% of employers tracking content, keystrokes, and 
time spent at the keyboard.65 Forty-three percent of companies studied 
monitored e-mail, with 96% of those tracking external incoming and outgoing 
messages.66 An earlier study “found a positive correlation between the size of 
the company and its level of monitoring and surveillance, with the largest 
companies conducting the most surveillance.”67 A 2010 study found that 37% 
of U.S. companies with one thousand or more employees employed staff 
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whose job it is to either read or analyze outbound e-mail and 48% performed 
regular audits of the outbound e-mail content.68 In summary, studies 
consistently support the scholarly claim that corporations do not prioritize the 
privacy of their corporate constituents. 
C. Contemporary Corporate Privacy Failure Examples 
Although some laws have changed69 by providing more protection for 
consumers and employees from certain limited types of privacy invasions,70 
the news continues to be littered with countless examples of corporate privacy 
invasions with regard to all types of corporate constituents as well as all types 
of industries. For example, privacy advocates have recently requested a closer 
look at consumer gadgets that are “always on,” including Microsoft’s Kinect 
controller, Amazon’s Echo assistant, and smart-televisions from Samsung and 
others.71 The Electronic Privacy Information Center has asked regulators to 
consider how data from such devices is collected and stored, in addition to 
whether consumers truly understand what data is being collected.72 
Some of these concerns about corporate treatment of consumer privacy 
have led to legal action. Yahoo is facing a class action lawsuit over claims that 
it accessed and analyzed the content of e-mails sent to Yahoo Mail users from 
non-Yahoo Mail accounts and used the data to boost its advertising revenue.73 
Google has been involved in numerous privacy lawsuits.74 In 2013, Google 
agreed to pay $7 million for secretly collecting personal information including 
e-mails and medical and financial records by data-scooping from millions of 
unencrypted wireless networks as it cruised by to create its Street View.75 The 
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company previously paid $22.5 million to settle FTC charges that it bypassed 
the privacy settings on Apple’s Safari browser.76 
Nor are these corporate privacy failures with regard to consumers limited 
to the Silicon Valley high-tech companies. Rather, as traditional industries 
begin to integrate technology in various ways into more traditional products, 
they too increasingly face problems with adequately protecting privacy. More 
traditional corporations, such as the automobile industry, have recently faced 
scrutiny both for “serious gaps” in protecting customer privacy from hackers in 
vehicles using wireless technology and for the manner in which they track 
driver behavior, and collect, transmit and store that information.77 
These concerns become more high stakes when the privacy of children is 
involved. Privacy advocates have criticized traditional toy company Mattel’s 
Hello Barbie, which is equipped with voice-recognition software that permits 
the doll to “listen” to the child’s words and respond appropriately, including 
learning information over time and adjusting to new topics.78 The doll “listens” 
by sending audio recordings of the child over the Internet to a server where the 
child’s conversations are recognized and processed.79 This invasion of a child’s 
personal conversations with his or her doll has caused privacy advocates to 
disparagingly call the doll Eavesdropping Barbie.80 
The story is similar with regard to companies invading employee privacy. 
Myrna Arias recently brought the reality of employer GPS tracking into the 
news.81 According to her lawsuit, Arias was fired after she disabled the GPS 
application on her company-issued smartphone after she discovered that her 
employer could track her even when she was off-duty.82 Such GPS tracking 
has long been common in company-owned vehicles, but now has increasingly 
been used through smartphones. Other employee invasions of privacy include 
drug testing programs, personality testing, intrusive wellness programs, 
computer, e-mail and technological monitoring, and employer control of off-
duty life.83 
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In addition to these invasions of consumer and employee privacy, the 
news is also filled with examples of corporations failing to adequately protect 
consumer and employee privacy and therefore suffering data and security 
breaches. For example, after the widely publicized Sony breach, current and 
former employees sued alleging that Sony did not adequately protect employee 
data.84 The hackers accessed data including the social security numbers of 
47,000 current and former employees, and the medical information of some 
employees and their families.85 Similar breaches have impacted companies in a 
variety of industries including graphics card company Nvidia,86 health insurer 
Anthem,87 home retailer Home Depot,88 and discount retailer Target.89  These 
anecdotal examples of corporate treatment of privacy reinforce the broader 
studies suggesting that corporations systematically fail to adequately address 
privacy concerns. 
D. Conventional Explanation of Corporate Privacy Failures 
As explained above, a consensus has developed among legal scholars 
concluding that corporations systematically fail with regard to the privacy of 
their constituents.90 The existing scholarship seeking to offer an explanation 
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for the way in which corporations treat privacy largely can be categorized into 
two related demand-side schools of thought. Although these two groups of 
scholars disagree as to the precise cause of the corporate treatment of privacy, 
and disagree as to whether the situation should be normatively categorized as a 
“problem,” both groups agree that the origin of the corporate privacy behavior 
occurs on the demand-side with the corporate constituents, most commonly the 
consumers.91 
The first group of scholars within the demand-side explanation contends 
that the corporate treatment of privacy merely reflects the low level of privacy 
preferences held by consumers in the free market. This free market camp, 
sometimes referred to as the “libertarian privacy establishment”92 or “market 
purists,”93 believes that the free market can adequately encourage corporations 
to respect privacy rights. Under this school of thought, if consumers actually 
value privacy they will choose to give their business to companies that protect 
their privacy and the market will respond to that demand accordingly.94 This 
will cause companies that fail to adequately protect consumer privacy to be 
driven from the marketplace. Conversely, under this neoclassical economic 
position, “If consumers choose to use services from companies that offer little 
to no privacy protection, that reveals a preference to spend little to nothing on 
(or looking for) privacy.”95 Therefore, according to this group of scholars, any 
examples of corporations invading or failing to protect consumer privacy 
merely reveal that the consumers prioritize other values such as efficiency, 
convenience, and personalization over protecting their privacy.96 
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This first camp contends that adequate market incentives already exist for 
corporations to protect privacy. They point to the existence of privacy-
protecting technology in certain domains, such as the “In Private” browsing 
mode, as proof that in certain circumstances the privacy market is working.97 
They also call attention to various examples where corporations have reversed 
previous plans in response to a public outrage over privacy. For instance, 
Yahoo removed the ability to run a reverse telephone number search on its 
People Search site after it faced extensive privacy concerns.98 Similarly, after 
facing a consumer backlash, Lexis-Nexis reversed its plans for a personal 
locator that would have provided the personal information, including the 
maiden names and social security numbers, of millions of people.99 For this 
group, these sorts of corporate reversals demonstrate the success of the privacy 
market, rather than the existence of a problem. Consequently, they contend that 
the prevailing corporate privacy behavior does not require governmental 
reform or regulation because there is no problem—corporations are merely 
accurately identifying where weak privacy preferences in the market exist.100  
Although the free market camp may be correct that sub-markets exist 
where privacy markets are robust, their account does not explain why such 
corporate reversals on privacy so frequently occur. Put differently, why aren’t 
corporations better at anticipating the privacy consumer backlashes ex ante, 
given the negative public relations the policy reversals generate as well as the 
sunk costs the corporation is forced to absorb when it is forced to backpedal ex 
post? One way to view the project of this Article is that it allows those scholars 
that subscribe to the consumer free market camp to offer an explanation for 
that question. 
By contrast, the second consumer-centric school of thought does not trust 
that the market is effective in protecting consumer privacy because there are a 
number of demand-side privacy market failures. For some of these scholars, 
the demand-side privacy market failure occurs in part because of “the lack of 
power that consumers have to determine the contractual terms governing the 
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sale or use of their data.”101 Even a consumer who wanted to take measures to 
protect his or her privacy, “would find the process nearly impossible,”102 as a 
result of the diverse tracking methods companies have at their disposal.103 For 
example, Solove uses a Kafka metaphor to describe “the power inequalities 
that pervade the world of information transfers between individuals and 
bureaucracies.”104 
In many industries, this power imbalance is exacerbated by the 
accumulation of market power that resembles the sort of power governed by 
antitrust law.105 For example, consumers who wished to shop for pro-privacy 
terms for their search and social networking activities would find few options 
and little choice because the dominant providers remain vastly superior to any 
available alternatives, and therefore “see little to no reason to compete to 
improve their privacy practices when users are so unlikely to defect.”106 
Consequently, the consumers are forced to consent to a particular type of 
privacy policy or not do business with an entire industry.107 
Additionally, a number of scholars have recognized a potential privacy 
market failure resulting from information asymmetries and breakdowns. First, 
companies’ privacy behavior is often not “readily observable” to consumers.108 
The privacy market does not adequately protect consumer privacy because so 
much data collection is done secretly.109 And even where corporations draft 
and post privacy policies, they rarely provide useful information to consumers. 
Corporate privacy policies tend to make vague promises to protect and respect 
privacy.110 Consumers rarely receive detailed explanations of what precisely 
the corporation will do with the information, what security measures are being 
taken, or what recourse they have if they disagree.111 Instead, consumers must 
rely on the corporation to fulfill the lofty ideals in the privacy policies in a 
manner acceptable to the consumer. 
Furthermore, the consumer often lacks the ability to know what is in the 
privacy policy in the first place. Even where they are available, and even if 
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they contained useful information, it is implausible to expect consumers to 
read large numbers of privacy policies.112 The existing privacy policy notice 
and opt-out regime involves excessively difficult transaction costs because 
consumers do not have “time or patience to read through cumbersome 
documents describing obscure rules for controlling data.”113 And many 
corporations change privacy policies frequently, making it harder for even the 
most diligent consumers to keep up with all the changes to these contracts of 
adhesion.114 
Additionally, Joseph Farrell describes the potential for a “cynical market 
failure” in which consumers expect that a company will not protect privacy 
regardless of any policy, so they fail to reward companies regardless of the 
actual practice.115 This creates a dysfunctional equilibrium in which companies 
have no incentive to protect privacy, which in turn reinforces the consumer 
expectations and exacerbates the situation.116 Furthermore, Joshua Fairfield 
and Christoph Engel have explained that these consumer failures get 
exacerbated because privacy should be conceived as a public good with 
negative externalities rather than one held by individual consumers.117 
Consequently, the erroneous focus on individual consumer privacy at the 
expense of privacy’s group dimension means that “individual consumers have 
been left to negotiate, unsuccessfully, with companies over the use of their 
data.”118 
Scholars also contend that the privacy market fails because consumers are 
unable to accurately price the value of their privacy. The value of a particular 
piece of information, such as a social security number, is not easy to ascertain 
for the individual consumer who cannot accurately capture the uncertain future 
uses that can be made with the data.119 This challenge is further exacerbated by 
an aggregation problem. An individual may be willing to trade away numerous 
innocuous bits of information in different contexts. Each revelation itself is 
perfectly innocent, but when combined can offer extensive insights into the 
individual. As Julie Cohen explains, “[A] comprehensive collection of data 
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about an individual is vastly more than the sum of its parts.”120 Therefore, in 
the context of each individual privacy-invading transaction, consumers cannot 
make a truly informed decision. Empirical research by Chris Hoofnagle and 
Jennifer Urban lends support to these demand-side market failure theories by 
showing that consumers had “fundamental misunderstandings about business 
practices, privacy protections, and restrictions upon the use of data” causing a 
distortion in the privacy market by leading “consumers to believe that they 
need not negotiate for privacy protections.”121 
As a result of the dominant focus on consumer-side market failures, 
scholars in this camp have thus far offered largely consumer-side solutions to 
the corporate privacy problem, whether market-based (more common in the 
United States), or government interventionist (more prominent in Europe). The 
American market-based consumer solutions typically center on technological 
consumer self-help efforts called Privacy Enhancing Technology (“PETs”).122 
For example, Lawrence Lessig advocates the use of computer software as an 
“electronic butler” to negotiate privacy preferences.123 The user would set 
preferences at the beginning explaining what privacy tradeoffs are permissible, 
and henceforth the software would negotiate the privacy tradeoffs on behalf of 
the consumer.124 Government interventionist proposals have taken a variety of 
consumer-centric forms, including do-not track lists following the model of the 
do-not-call list that would allow consumers more control over their privacy.125 
Although both categories of scholarly explanations for the corporate 
treatment of privacy offer very different approaches and disparate normative 
and descriptive conclusions, both camps share a demand-side account of the 
corporate privacy behavior, as well as demand-side solutions to the problem.126 
The demand-side explanations undoubtedly play an important role in 
understanding corporate treatment of privacy. This Article, however, seeks to 
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explain why such demand-side explanations can be better understood in 
conjunction with a supply-side story, and how the supply-side story in turn 
emphasizes the importance of the demand-side failures. 
II. SUPPLY-SIDE CORPORATE PRIVACY MARKET DISTORTION THEORY 
This Article adds a supply-side corporate privacy market distortion theory 
to the existing demand-side scholarly accounts seeking to explain why it is that 
corporations inadequately consider and protect privacy. The overall claim is 
that a combination of legal and societal structures, including legal corporate 
disclosure obligations and insatiable and legally unchecked media interest in 
corporate executives, undermines the ability of those corporate executives to 
maintain their own personal privacy. This creates a sorting effect by which 
those individuals who place a high priority or valuation on privacy are less 
likely to choose to become corporate executives. Consequently, the remaining 
individuals who do choose to become corporate executives are then less likely 
to place a high value on their personal privacy because had they prioritized 
privacy they would have sorted into a different career choice where they could 
have maintained their privacy. Therefore, the theory predicts that the very 
same corporate executives tasked with making important corporate decisions 
that impact privacy are less likely to place a high value on privacy. These low 
personal privacy preferences on the part of corporate executives then impact 
the decision making of those executives with regard to corporate privacy issues 
as the result of a variety of recognized cognitive and behavioral phenomena. 
This Part presents the theory as follows. First, it identifies the features of 
the legal and societal systems that invade the personal privacy of corporate 
executives.127 Second, it explores the existing research supporting the view 
that individual privacy preferences are heterogeneous.128 Third, it explains why 
corporate executives would sort by privacy preferences in light of the existing 
more general research on sorting where there are heterogeneous preferences.129 
It then explains how this sorting results in a phenomenon by which high-level 
corporate executives at publicly traded companies are disproportionately likely 
to be drawn from the portion of the population who do not place a high value 
on privacy, as the privacy-valuing individuals sort away from these sorts of 
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high-level corporate positions.130 Finally, it explores the various cognitive and 
behavioral biases as well as corporate decision-making processes that together 
help explain how these executives’ personal privacy preferences may impact 
corporate behavior.131 This occurs, in part, because executives undervalue or 
potentially do not even recognize the privacy implications of their decisions.132 
To be clear, this supply-side theory is not intended to provide a stand-
alone substitute for the existing demand-side theories. Rather, the supply-side 
theory offered here, and the existing demand-side theories in the literature, 
should be viewed as mutually reinforcing explanations that together do a better 
job of explaining corporate privacy behavior than either theory standing alone. 
Put differently, if the demand-side privacy market was working well then the 
supply-side corporate privacy market distortions would not have a significant 
impact. Conversely, however, the supply-side corporate market distortion helps 
explain the short-term corporate privacy failures that occur even where the 
consumer-side market ultimately works fairly well. That is it helps explain the 
repeated observations in which a corporation has been required to reverse an 
existing plan or policy with the waste of resources that accompanies such a 
course reversal as the result of a seemingly unforeseen privacy backlash. 
A. Systemic Features Impede Corporate Executive Privacy 
Under existing laws and societal practices in the United States, high-level 
corporate executives working for publicly traded companies are usually unable 
to keep their personal information private. First, driven partially by the rise in 
widespread public participation in investments in publicly traded corporations, 
the media treats corporate executives as public figures whose personal lives are 
subject to media exposure. Furthermore, courts have not placed any serious 
limits on the media’s ability to invade the privacy of corporate executives as 
the result of broad interpretations of the public figure and the newsworthiness 
doctrines with the reduced protection of privacy that goes along with those 
doctrinal characterizations. Second, a failure to consider privacy within the 
securities disclosure regime means that large categories of personal facts about 
corporate executives may be subject to mandatory shareholder disclosure. 
These features prevent those individuals considering a position as a high-level 
corporate executive at a publicly traded corporation from being able to trust 
that they would be able to maintain their personal privacy. 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See infra notes 221–231 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 232–255 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 232–255 and accompanying text. 
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1. Corporate Executives Are Treated as Public Figures 
The American media has come to treat corporate executives of publicly 
traded corporations as celebrities worthy of media attention including reporting 
on various aspects of their personal lives. The resulting loss of privacy is 
largely driven by two simultaneous societal trends: (1) a growth of the investor 
pool across a wider cross-section of society and (2) the explosion of 
information technology.133 
The United States has seen a large growth in the number of individuals 
investing directly or indirectly in the stock market. The number of households 
owning equities in the United States has rapidly expanded from 15.9 million in 
1983, to 40 million in 1995, and 56.9 million in 2005.134 On a percent basis, 
this increase translates to a change from 19% of American households owning 
equities in 1983 to 50.3% owning equities in 2005.135 At the individual level a 
similar explosion in investment has occurred with the 42.4 million individual 
U.S. investors owning equities in 1983 ballooning into 91.1 million individual 
U.S investors, or approximately 1 in 3, owning equities in 2005.136 This growth 
in individual investors has been accompanied by an expansion in the pool of 
individual investors from what used to be mostly wealthy and sophisticated 
individuals to individuals from all paths of life.137 
These individual investors, rightly or wrongly,138 came to view corporate 
executives as “doppelgangers of their firms,” and therefore a primary factor in 
their investment decision making.139 This view of the corporate executive led 
to a demand for a wide variety of information, including personal information 
about the corporate executive, perhaps because this is the sort of information 
that the individual investor could digest better than the technical information 
about a corporation’s financial positions.140 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 923–24 (2012) 
(noting that the rise of these “two macroeconomic trends has resulted in . . . a depreciation of their 
individual privacy”). 
 134 See INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUSTRY ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005, at 1 
fig.1 (2005). 
 135 See id. at 7 fig.9. 
 136 See id. at 8 fig.10. 
 137 See id. at 4–5 figs.5 & 7 (showing that investors vary across both age and education). 
 138 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 989 (2010) 
(arguing that in recent years CEOs of publicly held corporations are losing power relative to the 
boards of directors and their shareholders). 
 139 Lin, supra note 133, at 924–25 (explaining that executives are perceived by investors “not as 
temporary stewards of business enterprises, but as saviors of industry, alter-egos of firms, and 
celebrities of society”). 
 140 See Patricia Sánchez Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at 
the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2010) (explaining that 
“higher investment by average folks” has led to the celebrity status of corporate executives). 
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In turn, this increased demand in information about corporate executives 
is happily provided by a media experiencing a simultaneous explosion in 
information technology. Modern society’s expanding use of social media,141 as 
well as other technological advances, has created an environment in which the 
media is able to report on the personal lives of corporate executives.142 CEOs 
at many major corporations have received so much media attention, in fact, 
that Harvard Business School and Sociology Professor Rakesh Khurana 
dubbed this phenomenon the “distinctly American cult of the CEO.”143 Patricia 
Sánchez Abril has extensively documented this phenomenon finding that 
“[o]ver the past half-century, digital communications, globalization, mass-
market media and advertising, and a heightened public interest in business 
matters have conspired to shine a brighter spotlight on business leaders as 
stars.”144 
Recent news stories provide a multitude of examples demonstrating the 
increased appetite for and feeding of that appetite with information regarding 
the personal lives of corporate executives. Consider, for example, Steve Jobs, 
the well-known founder of Apple Computers. Following Jobs’s death in 2011, 
Americans became so interested in Jobs’s life that a biography released soon 
after his death sold over 379,000 copies in its first week, making it the top 
selling book in the nation.145 A later-released film documenting the founder’s 
life raised over $16 million, and was even criticized for not revealing enough 
about Jobs’s personal affairs.146 
Although Jobs provides an unusual example of just how interested the 
public can become in the private lives of CEOs and other corporate executives, 
he is by no means the only corporate figure whose personal life has attracted 
such high levels of public attention. The CEO of Amazon, Jeff Bezos, provides 
another good example; as Amazon has continued to grow, so has Bezos’s 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See, e.g., Chris Perry, Research: Social Media Finally Seen as Essential for CEOs, FORBES 
(May 29, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisperry/2013/05/29/research-social-
media-finally-seen-as-essential-for-ceos/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20160620061302/http://www.
forbes.com/sites/chrisperry/2013/05/29/research-social-media-finally-seen-as-essential-for-ceos/#
73762ed77126] (noting that 76% of global executives surveyed stated that they wanted the CEOs to 
be more heavily involved in social media and public engagement). 
 142 See Lin, supra note 133, at 926. 
 143 RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR 
CHARISMATIC CEOS 68 (2002). 
 144 Patricia Sánchez Abril, The Evolution of Business Celebrity in American Law and Society, 48 
AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2011). 
 145 Brandon Griggs, Steve Jobs Biography Is Top Selling Book in the U.S., CNN (Nov. 3, 2011, 
10:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/03/tech/innovation/steve-jobs-book-sales/ [http://www.cnn.
com/2011/11/03/tech/innovation/steve-jobs-book-sales/]. 
 146 Jobs (2013), IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2357129/ [https://perma.cc/4CV9-Y7JF] 
(reporting Jobs grossed $16,117,443 in the United States). 
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public presence.147 Another prominent corporate figure, Apple’s current CEO 
Tim Cook, has also attracted extensive media attention. Cook appears in the 
news regularly, and even went so far as to appear on the popular “Late Show 
with Stephen Colbert” to discuss numerous details of his professional and 
personal life, including his highly-publicized decision to come out publicly as 
gay.148 Warren Buffett, the well-known CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, has also 
been the focus of public interest for his personal romantic relationships, with 
articles and even a published biography discussing intimate details about the 
women in his life.149 
Although the cult of celebrity surrounding the American CEO is a large 
part of the phenomenon, Abril found that the business fame also “trickled 
down to” more ordinary, “rank-and-file executives.”150 The business literature 
has also extensively documented this “business celebrity culture,” as well as 
the role played by business journalists who reduce complex business dynamics 
to a corporate executive driven process.151 
The extensive media and public interest in the private lives of corporate 
executives has been exacerbated by limited legal protection for the privacy of 
those corporate executives. In the defamation context, the Supreme Court has 
held that the First Amendment requires that in order to prevail, individuals 
found to be public figures must prove that the defamatory statement was made 
with “actual malice.”152 This means that the defendant must have had actual 
knowledge that the statement was false, or acted with reckless disregard as to 
whether it was false or not.153 Furthermore, the actual malice requirement must 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.154 Establishing actual malice in 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Tim Appelo, 10 Things You Didn’t Know About Jeff Bezos and Amazon, HOLLYWOOD REP. 
(Oct. 18, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/10-things-you-didnt-know-
649386 [https://perma.cc/8RN8-VZSW] (discussing the publication of an extensive book about Bezos 
and his life, based on stories from over 300 sources). 
 148 Keith Wagstaff, Apple CEO Tim Cook Talks Steve Jobs with Stephen Colbert, NBC NEWS (Sept. 
16, 2015, 11:13 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/apple-ceo-tim-cook-talks-steve-jobs-
stephen-colbert-n428316 [https://perma.cc/47XV-TMAG]. 
 149 Barbara Kiviat, Warren Buffet Tells All: The Women in His Life, TIME (Sept. 23, 2008), http://
content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1843839,00.html [https://perma.cc/GS3M-9YV4]. 
 150 Abril, supra note 144, at 178. 
 151 Id. at 179 (citing Mathew L.A. Hayward et al., Believing One’s Own Press: The Causes and 
Consequences of CEO Celebrity, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 637, 645 (2004)). 
 152 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Laura A. Heymann, The 
Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1379–80 (2011) 
(explaining further the “actual malice” standard enunciated in the Court’s holding in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan). 
 153 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 154 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); see also David Han, Rethinking 
Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1184 (discussing the various rules governing public 
figures). 
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defamation cases has proved extremely challenging, such that receiving public 
figure status makes winning a defamation lawsuit a long shot.155  
Abril’s work demonstrates that “major cases analyzing whether business 
executives are public figures map neatly onto the historical rise of business 
celebrity culture.”156 In early cases, businessmen were typically found to be 
private figures, but as business gained notoriety in the 1980s, they “morphed 
into public figures in the eyes of the law.”157 By the 1990s, Abril discovered a 
notable absence of defamation cases involving corporate executives.158 She 
persuasively hypothesizes that this collapse in cases is best explained by 
recognition on the part of the corporate executives that their notoriety spelled 
defeat for any possible defamation lawsuit, rather than an actual reduction in 
defamatory invasions of their privacy.159 Consequently, she concludes that 
“[p]ublic notoriety became part of the job description of some CEOs with 
diminished privacy being an occupational hazard.”160 
Because probable public figure status means that corporate executives 
find it extremely difficult to keep defamatory statements about themselves out 
of the press, predictably under the existing legal frameworks, they will find it 
even more impossible to keep truthful, but personal information private. Under 
the public disclosure of private facts tort, individuals can sue to prevent the 
dissemination of private facts about them that would be highly offensive and 
objectionable to a reasonable person.161 Much private personal information 
about the corporate executive including his or her lifestyle choices, divorce, 
and health conditions may not be considered shameful enough to meet the 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (finding that petitioner did not act with 
actual malice when falsely accusing a public official of engaging in criminal conduct); Tavoulareas v. 
Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 775–76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“It is equally well established that the standard of actual 
malice requires proof not merely that the defamatory publication was false, but that the defendant 
either knew the statement to be false or that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication.”); see also David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 487, 493 (1991) (explaining the difficulty of proving actual malice). 
 156 Abril, supra note 144, at 183. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 203–04. 
 159 Id. at 204. 
 160 Id.; see also Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 145 (2012) (stating that corporate executives 
“fall into the voluntary public figure category and hold almost as limited a claim to a right of privacy 
as do public officials”). 
 161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Doe v. 
Gangland Prods., 730 F.3d 946, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining the requirements for proving a 
claim for public disclosure of private facts); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 
1998) (analyzing the elements of the publication of private facts tort). 
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offensiveness requirement of the tort.162 Even if the corporate executive could 
meet that offensiveness hurdle, however, the tort contains an absolute defense 
for information that is considered “of legitimate public concern,” which has 
been interpreted by some courts as a finding of “newsworthiness.”163 
Newsworthiness appears to be an even lower standard than the public figure 
test in the defamation context,164 and is often met as long as there is public 
interest in the matter.165 The newsworthiness test, in today’s society, appears to 
be met for all information related to corporate executives. Therefore, corporate 
executives can hope for very little protection from either defamation law or the 
relevant privacy torts to keep their information private from inquiring business 
media and its hungry audience.166 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007) (expressing doubt whether a 
statement that the plaintiff had engaged in unspecified “destructive behavior” would satisfy the 
offensiveness requirement because it was an insufficiently “sensitive or intimate private fact”). 
 163 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478 (concluding that the “analysis of newsworthiness inevitably 
involves accommodating conflicting interests in personal privacy and in press freedom as guaranteed 
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution”). The court stated that 
where the facts disclosed about a private person involuntarily caught up in events of 
public interest bear a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the broadcast 
and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their relevance—the broadcast was of 
legitimate public concern, barring liability under the private facts tort. 
Id. 
 164 See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining in 
analyzing a public disclosure of private facts tort that “[p]eople who do not desire the limelight and do 
not deliberately choose a way of life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it nevertheless 
have no legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that have befallen them are newsworthy, even if 
they would prefer that those experiences be kept private”). 
 165 See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167–68 (1979) (suggesting that 
newsworthiness equates public interest by stating in a defamation case that plaintiffs actions “no 
doubt were ‘newsworthy,’ but the simple fact that these events attracted media attention also is not 
conclusive of the public-figure issue,” and that “[a] private individual is not automatically transformed 
into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public 
attention”). 
 166 See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 140, at 1581 (finding that “strong arguments can be made 
that any information bearing on the honesty, integrity, or ability of the head of a publicly traded 
corporation is legitimately newsworthy” and therefore corporate executives “enjoy an extremely 
limited private sphere”); Tom C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters 
of Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 424 (2009) (arguing that corporate 
executives “should reasonably expect to abdicate a certain level of privacy” as “[t]he proliferation of 
new media coupled with the growth in securities investing by ordinary citizens has further intensified 
coverage of public company executives” and fed “the public’s insatiable appetite for more 
information”); cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2010, 2014 (2013) (explaining that “privacy protections for people voluntarily in the public eye 
in the United States are basically negligible”). 
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2. Corporate Disclosure Requirements Invade Privacy 
As explained above, corporate executives are already forced to give up 
their personal privacy as the result of the intense scrutiny by the media and the 
public. For executives of publicly traded corporations, this loss of privacy is 
exacerbated by an unintended consequence of an ambiguous securities law 
corporate disclosure regime that was understandably designed without any 
consideration of the privacy impact on corporate executives.167 
First, corporate disclosure rules mandate disclosing certain categories of 
personal information about corporate executives including the executive’s 
age,168 involvement in certain legal proceedings including personal bankruptcy 
filings,169 and the compensation packages for five highly paid executives.170 
More significantly, other personal information about corporate executives can 
potentially fall under the catchall disclosure regime created by the Exchange 
Act and SEC rules, which requires disclosing material information, where a 
duty to disclose arises.171 Under governing Supreme Court precedent, factual 
information about a corporation becomes material if there exists a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the factual information 
important in making an investment decision, or if a reasonable investor would 
view disclosure of the fact as significantly altering the “total mix” of 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See generally Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 487, 505–07 (2013) (discussing problems with the securities law corporate disclosure regime). 
 168 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b) (2016). Item 401 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of general 
biographical detail including the executive’s age. Id. 
 169 Id. § 229.401(f)(1)–(2). Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K requires the company to disclose the 
CEO’s personal bankruptcy filings, any adjudicated violations of the securities or commodities laws, 
and whether the executive “was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject of a pending 
criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses).” Id. On its face, this rule 
does not apply to most types of civil litigation, such as divorce or a criminal investigation that did not 
result in a criminal proceeding. Id. 
 170 Id. § 229.402. Regulation S-K, Item 402, requires disclosure of the salary, bonus, stock 
awards, stock option awards, and other compensation elements for the principle executive officer, 
principal financial officer, and the other three most highly compensated executive officers. Id. 
 171 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). Scholars and 
practitioners disagree as to whether there is anything in the securities laws that creates a duty to 
disclose personal information about executives. Compare Abril & Olazábal, supra note 140, at 1591 
(finding no basis for an affirmative duty to disclose private CEO facts), with Allan Horwich, When the 
Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corporation Obligated to Disclose That Illness 
and Should the Securities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 827, 838 (2009) (finding “little doubt” that the existing disclosure requirements “would 
encompass material uncertainties arising out of a known health problem suffered by a luminary”), and 
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored 
Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 790, 802 
(2007) (explaining the difficulty in determining SEC disclosure requirements and proposing 
“relatively straightforward mandatory disclosure rules”). 
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information.172 So-called “soft information” about a corporation—generally 
predictions and other forward-looking information—becomes material based 
on a different test that involves the “balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of 
the totality of the company activity.”173 
These two tests presumably apply to determine whether the corporation is 
required to disclose personal information about corporate executives to its 
shareholders. Significantly, there is no privacy exception to the corporation’s 
disclosure requirements. In fact, neither of these tests takes into account any 
consideration of the corporate executive’s privacy interest as a countervailing 
consideration weighing against disclosure.174 
Therefore, if there is either a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider the information important in making an investment 
decision, or view the disclosure of the information as significantly altering the 
“total mix” of information, then corporate executives’ personal information  
may be subject to disclosure. Various personal facts about corporate executives 
may satisfy this test including health information, financial trouble, divorce, 
extramarital affairs or other romantic liaisons, the purchase of homes or other 
large luxury items, and the death or illness of a child or other loved one.175 
Shareholders might legitimately consider some personal information about 
executives relevant because it provides insight into the ability of the executive 
to do his or her job. This may result from concern about the executive’s ability 
to adequately focus on the job, or alternatively because there is concern as to 
whether the executive will stay on the job. 
In the first scenario where there is concern about an executive’s ability to 
focus on the job, the disclosure of the personal fact signals to the shareholder 
that the executive’s effectiveness on the job is impaired because the personal 
fact represents some sort of distraction or other impediment to the executive’s 
typical time, energy, or focus on the company.176 Various personal facts about 
the executive might trigger this concern about his or her ability to perform the 
job including the distraction that results from going through a messy divorce, 
or the challenges that result from the death of a family member. The limited 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 173 Id. at 238. 
 174 See Schwartz, supra note 167, at 507. 
 175 See id. at 494–97. 
 176 Some scholars have downplayed the legitimacy of the disclosure interest in personal 
information about executives as merely an example of celebrity-fascination. Although celebrity 
fascination is certainly part of the picture, this Article offers an account of disclosure in which there 
are legitimate reasons beyond celebrity fascination for why shareholders and investors would care 
about the information. 
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empirical research that exists supports this shareholder concern. Finance 
scholars at NYU’s Stern School of Business found that the profitability of a 
company on average diminished by approximately 2.4 percentage points in the 
two years following the death of a CEO’s child as compared to the previous 
two years.177 The scholars reported a similar drop in the company’s return on 
assets following the death of a CEO’s parent (although no change following 
the death of a mother-in-law).178 This suggests there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the deeply personal information 
about a death in the executive’s family to be relevant in making an investment 
decision. 
In the second scenario where there is concern as to whether an executive 
will stay on the job, shareholders would consider personal information relevant 
to their investment decisions if the information provides insight regarding the 
executive’s ability to retain the job. This may matter to shareholders because 
they believe a particular executive is unusually good at his or her job, and there 
is a concern that the successor may not be equally effective. Alternatively, this 
may matter to the shareholders because of a belief that the company is not well 
situated to go through a smooth leadership transition. Of course this transition 
concern could be ameliorated with better succession planning, but nonetheless 
this remains a legitimate concern for shareholders.179 Finally, shareholders may 
believe that a particular executive is underperforming, but that due to capture 
and other corporate governance issues the board is unlikely to remove him or 
her.  In that scenario, shareholders might consider personal information that 
suggests that the executive is likely to leave as a positive input impacting the 
investment decision. Personal facts that could impact the executive’s ability to 
stay on the job include a serious or terminal illness or serious criminal legal 
problems. The limited empirical research supports this shareholder concern 
with losing an executive as well.180 
These scenarios suggest that a wide variety of personal information about 
executives—including such private sensitive information as health information 
and challenges with an individual’s family—could fit into the definitions of 
materiality. And as stated earlier, the rules do not contain any exception that 
would permit the executive’s privacy to outweigh the disclosure requirement. 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Morten Bennedsen et al., Do CEO’s Matter? 15 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3177/valueceos.pdf [https://perma.
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 178 Id. 
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Predictably, actual corporate disclosure behavior mimics the ambiguity in 
the existing securities disclosure regime regarding whether and when personal 
information about executives must be disclosed to shareholders. On one hand, 
Apple took a strong non-disclosure position with regard to the health of Steve 
Jobs, choosing to remain silent in the face of Jobs’s early fight with cancer, and 
continuing to make vague statements as his health declined.181 Numerous other 
companies have similarly disclosed very little.182 On the other hand, Berkshire 
Hathaway took a different approach to the health of Warren Buffett, choosing 
to provide a detailed press release to shareholders providing details of Buffett’s 
colon surgery.183 Other companies have also chosen to disclose information 
about its executives based on an apparent belief that it is legally required for 
them to do so.184 Legally and practically, at best there is confusion regarding 
whether corporations must disclose information about corporate executives to 
their shareholders, resulting in an inability of corporate executives to trust that 
they will be able to protect their privacy should they desire to do so. As such, 
the corporate disclosure requirements thus act as a sort of tax, or a legal wedge 
that distorts the labor market for corporate executives.  
3. Other Privacy Laws Fail to Fill in the Gap 
The various federal and state statutory privacy laws do not adequately 
protect the privacy of the corporate executive (or anyone else for that matter), 
because they are specifically tailored to particular scenarios or contexts.185 For 
example, although HIPAA governs the privacy of health information,186 it only 
applies to “covered entities,” which does not include either the media or the 
corporate employer.187 Similarly, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
only applies to banks or other financial institutions, and would not govern the 
media or corporate employer.188 Furthermore, the Right to Financial Privacy 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Schwartz, supra note 167, at 512–14 (documenting the saga involving Apple’s failure to 
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 182 See id. at 515 (noting that both Intel and Bear Stearns elected to hide the prostate health issues 
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 183 Id. at 514. 
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Act of 1978 protects the confidentiality of customers’ financial information, 
not the financial records of executives or other employees.189 
Some privacy-related statutes do apply to the corporation as an employer, 
but only limit the use of information obtained in very specific scenarios. For 
example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act all contain nondisclosure provisions.190 The 
case law interpreting these statutes, however, has limited those provisions to 
information obtained as the result of an authorized medical examination or 
inquiry, and has excluded information obtained by voluntary disclosure by the 
employee, which has been interpreted quite broadly.191 Similarly, the 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 limits protections to information 
obtained as the result of a prohibited lie detector test.192 Additionally, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act only covers an employer’s use of information collected 
as part of a “consumer report” on the employment application.193 
In summary, the combination of: (1) the diversification of the investor 
pool resulting in increased media and public interest in corporate executives, 
(2) the boom in information technology resulting in widespread reporting on 
such corporate executives, (3) the lack of legal protection for the private lives 
of the corporate executives, and (4) the ambiguity regarding whether 
corporations are required to disclose private facts about corporate executives to 
their shareholders, all combine to result in a system in which candidates 
looking to become corporate executives at publicly traded companies cannot 
trust that they will be able to maintain their privacy. 
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B. Heterogeneity in Individual Privacy Preferences 
The inability of corporate executives to maintain their privacy would not 
have a significant sorting effect if privacy preferences were homogenous. The 
existing evidence suggests, however, that individual privacy preferences, like 
many types of preferences, are heterogeneous, meaning that some individuals 
inherently have more of a taste for privacy than others.194 Although most of the 
existing experimental and survey research-based empirical work has been done 
within the consumer context, nothing about the studies or underlying theory 
suggests that consumers have unique characteristics such that the conclusions 
about heterogeneity of privacy preferences cannot be inferred from a consumer 
population to the population at large more generally. 
Prominent privacy scholar Alan Westin extrapolated from decades of 
privacy opinion surveys to conclude that the American public can be divided 
into three categories of privacy preferences.195 At one extreme are individuals 
that Westin titled the “privacy fundamentalists,” which Westin estimated 
comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the population.196 Consistent 
with their name, privacy fundamentalists view privacy as extremely high value 
and are largely unwilling to trade away their privacy.197 Privacy fundamentalists 
reject the suggestion that business and governmental programs are entitled to 
receive personal information, and believe that more individuals should refuse 
to give out requested information.198  
Westin named the middle and largest category of individuals, estimated at 
fifty-five percent of the population, the “privacy pragmatists.”199 This group 
takes a more nuanced approach to privacy, in which any requests for personal 
information get balanced against the benefits from disclosing the requested 
information.200 Privacy pragmatists often base their decision on the degree of 
trust in the particular industry or company involved.201 
Finally, the least privacy concerned group, which Westin dubbed “privacy 
unconcerned” and estimated at twenty percent of the population, does not have 
any objection to supplying personal information to either the government or 
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businesses.202 Westin found that not only did the privacy unconcerned have no 
problem giving up their own information, but they entirely failed to recognize 
what the privacy fuss is all about.203 This failure by the privacy unconcerned to 
even understand what the privacy fuss is all about will become important later 
in this Section, in discussing the implications of the sorting effect by corporate 
leadership. 
Although Westin’s methodologies and the breakdown of his categories 
have been questioned by scholars, none of these criticisms have attacked or 
even questioned the core conclusion that individual privacy preferences are 
heterogeneous.204 On the contrary, other scholars have been able to replicate 
Westin’s categories of heterogeneous privacy preferences in different contexts 
using similar survey methodologies, although they found slight differences in 
the exact breakdowns of the categories. 
For example, in a survey studying the online privacy concerns of Internet 
users, computer scientist Mark S. Ackerman and his team found that 17% of 
respondents were privacy fundamentalists who were extremely concerned 
about any use of their data, and were unwilling to provide data to websites 
even with privacy protections in place.205 Fifty-six percent of respondents 
comprised the pragmatic majority whose privacy concerns were often 
significantly reduced by the presence of privacy protection measures.206 
Finally, 27% of respondents, renamed the “marginally concerned,” were 
willing to provide data to websites under almost any condition.207 
Subsequently, an additional study by information systems scholars Sarah 
Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags, and Bettina Berendt also found heterogeneity 
of privacy preferences.208 This study revealed a slightly higher percentage of 
privacy fundamentalists at 30%, and a slightly lower percentage of marginally 
concerned at 24%, than the Ackerman study.209 Furthermore, the study broke 
down the pragmatic majority that had been identified by Westin and confirmed 
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by Ackerman into two distinct groups.210 The “identity concerned” group, 
comprising 20% of the full sample, encompassed individuals whose privacy 
concerns focused on the revelation of identity aspects such as name, address, 
or e-mail.211 The “profiling adverse” group, comprising 26% of the overall 
surveyed population, primarily focused on the profiling of interests, hobbies, 
health, and other personal information.212 
Heterogeneity in privacy preferences has also been found using other 
non-survey based methodologies. For example, business scholar Il-Horn Hann, 
and information systems scholars Kai-Lung Hui, Tom S. Lee, and I.P.L. Png 
also found strong support for their privacy diversity hypothesis that individuals 
have systematic differences in privacy preferences.213 They too identified three 
distinct segments in the studied population with very different attitudes toward 
privacy.214 Rather than Westin’s methodological choice of opinion surveys, 
these scholars first used conjoint analysis, a measurement method for decision-
making contexts where multiple dimensions must be considered, across focus 
groups to assess trade-offs among two benefits and three privacy concerns.215 
Then employing cluster analysis,216 they found that seventy-two percent of 
American subjects can be characterized as “privacy guardians”—individuals 
who attach a relatively high value to information privacy.217 By contrast, a 
smaller group of American subjects can be characterized as “information 
sellers”—those who place very little emphasis on privacy and are thus willing 
to trade their privacy for a perceived monetary reward.218 Finally, a third small 
group, “convenience seekers,” focused exclusively on convenience with little 
regard for money or privacy.219 
Although the conjoint analysis methodology divided up the privacy 
categories differently than Westin did, both sets of scholarship are consistent 
with a conclusion that individual privacy preferences are heterogeneous. 
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Therefore, regardless of where exactly the lines of categories are drawn, it 
seems likely that individual privacy preferences range a full spectrum from 
caring deeply, to caring somewhat, to not caring very much at all. In light of all 
this evidence, privacy scholars have embraced the conclusion that privacy 
preferences are heterogeneous.220 
C. Corporate Executives Sort Away From Privacy 
Given the existence of heterogeneous privacy preferences, the next step in 
the supply-side corporate privacy market distortion theory is to examine the 
privacy preferences likely held by corporate executives. This subpart identifies 
some reasons to believe that overall corporate executives fall on the low end of 
the privacy spectrum, meaning that they do not place a high value on their own 
privacy as the result of a sorting mechanism. 
Employees at all levels engage in sorting.221 Sorting means that individual 
employees move across different employment situations and even industries in 
order to maximize the things they prioritize. The sorting phenomenon relies on 
the assumption that employees have heterogeneous preferences with regards to 
various features of employment.222 
For example, if a group of individuals highly values schedule flexibility, 
then those individuals likely sort themselves into employment with employers 
who offer more schedule flexibility. If, however, an entire industry or position 
does not offer schedule flexibility, then one would expect individuals who 
highly value schedule flexibility to sort toward another industry or a different 
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type of position that maximize as many of those individuals’ other priorities as 
possible, but that also allows for increased schedule flexibility.223 Individuals 
who do not place a high value on schedule flexibility, however, will sort based 
on features that matter more to them such as earning higher wages, developing 
human capital, or achieving more fulfillment in their work.224 The flip-side of 
this phenomenon is that the same features that cause individuals to sort into 
employment with a particular employer, into a particular industry, or into a 
particular type of position, can cause others to sort out of those exact same 
employers, industries, or positions.225 
By no means is sorting a perfectly efficient phenomenon. The claim is not 
that every single individual placing a high value on schedule flexibility will 
sort themselves into a job where they can have schedule flexibility. Individuals 
need to balance a variety of complex factors, and most employees place a high 
value on various terms and conditions of employment, and need to figure out 
how to balance across the options in different job markets. The claim is merely 
that all else being equal, individuals who place a high value on a particular 
feature of employment will tend to overall sort themselves into employment 
containing that employment feature if possible given their other priorities. 
The sorting dynamic is not limited to low-level employees. Rather, a 
similar phenomenon can occur with the category of candidates who might be 
qualified to become corporate executives, in which features about corporate 
executive positions will lead individuals with various characteristics to sort 
themselves into different career choices.226 For example, scholars have noted 
the way in which structuring executive compensation as pay for performance 
with large percentages of stock options can lead to a sorting effect in favor of 
individuals becoming corporate executives with high tolerances for risk227 or 
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high emphasis on monetary rewards and financial metrics as opposed to other 
goals.228 
Just like other non-monetary aspects of employment for which employees 
have heterogeneous preferences, individual employees also sort themselves 
based on their heterogeneous privacy preferences. Within a particular industry 
or career, individuals can sort toward privacy protective employers if they have 
both the choice and information to do so. For example, if some big law firms 
began to engage in various privacy-invasive behaviors such as GPS tracking, 
keystroke monitoring, etc., one would expect individuals with higher privacy 
valuations to sort away from those firms and towards firms who do not engage 
in those privacy-invasive behaviors. If, however, an entire industry or type of 
job position necessarily involved an invasion of privacy, then individuals who 
highly prioritize privacy would be expected to sort away from those industries 
or jobs. Thus one would expect that individuals who highly value privacy 
would not pursue appearing on reality television.229 Similarly, individuals who 
highly value privacy and are interested in policymaking might be expected to 
choose to work behind-the-scenes for a politician, but would likely not choose 
to actually run for political office.230 
As a consequence of the features of the existing legal system discussed 
above, candidates capable of becoming high-level executives at publicly traded 
corporations are unable to trust that they will be able to keep their personal 
information private. Consequently, consistent with the theory of employee 
sorting, the market for corporate executives will also be subject to a sorting 
effect in which highly qualified individuals who strongly value privacy will 
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choose to take their talents in different directions and instead will opt for other 
sorts of careers, which would be less likely to require them to forego their own 
personal privacy. Even if those privacy-valuing individuals also (like most 
people) place a high value on money, talented individuals with corporate-
executive type resumes usually still have the option to pursue other types of 
business-oriented careers where they can expect high levels of compensation 
without foregoing their privacy, such as perhaps working in banking, hedge 
funds, management consulting, and private equity.231 As a consequence of this 
sorting effect, the individuals that remain in pursuit of the high-level corporate 
executive positions are less likely to be drawn from the population that highly 
values privacy. Put differently, by failing to adequately protect the privacy of 
corporate leadership, the existing legal system makes it more likely that the 
individuals who choose to pursue corporate leadership do not themselves care 
about privacy. 
D. Privacy Sorting Impacts Corporate Privacy Decisions 
Corporate executives are in a position to make decisions with tremendous 
privacy implications for corporate constituents. After all, corporate actors have 
a great deal of power to shape the treatment of privacy.232 As explained above, 
the privacy sorting phenomenon means that individuals who choose to become 
corporate executives are less likely to place a high value on privacy. 
Even if the majority of corporate executives were evenly distributed 
across the lower-privacy side of the heterogeneous privacy spectrum, that 
would still mean that a disproportionate number of corporate executives are 
drawn from the population that Westin called the “privacy unconcerned” as 
compared with the population as a whole.233 This is particularly concerning in 
light of Westin’s findings that individuals who are privacy unconcerned not 
only do not care about their own privacy, but actually don’t understand what 
the entire privacy fuss is all about.234 This suggests that a disproportionate 
number of corporate executives not only don’t care about their own privacy, 
but also actually fail to even recognize why others might be concerned about 
their privacy. Perhaps with this perspective in mind, McNealy’s oft-repeated 
statement that individuals “have zero privacy anyway” and should just “get 
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over it” may make more sense.235 Perhaps McNealy is a privacy unconcerned 
individual, and as such might not understand why people are so worked up 
about protecting their own privacy. If Westin is correct, then society should be 
particularly concerned about a sorting effect in which a disproportional number 
of corporate executives would fall in the privacy unconcerned portion of the 
spectrum. That would mean that the very people who do not understand what 
the privacy fuss is all about, are the decisionmakers making various crucial 
corporate decisions that impact employee and consumer privacy. In the worst 
case scenario, a corporate executive may entirely fail to recognize a privacy 
issue when the issue is not directly in front of them, but is buried in a decision 
that does not on its face appear to be about privacy. To use the language of law 
school professors, the privacy unconcerned corporate executive may not even 
spot the privacy issue on the exam. 
Even, however, if corporate executives are just privacy pragmatists with 
lower valuations of privacy who have concluded that they are willing to take 
the tradeoff in their privacy in return for the many benefits of being a corporate 
executive, including money, prestige, and power, there are still reasons to be 
concerned. Even if the corporate executive is not all the way on the privacy 
unconcerned side of the spectrum, just having privacy be a low priority to 
them personally may impact corporate privacy decisions, as the result of a 
number of well-known behavioral and psychological phenomena increasingly 
recognized in the behavioral economics literature.236 Alessandro Acquisti has 
extensively written about how various biases impact economic decisions in the 
privacy sphere.237 He explains that “[d]ue to the uncertainties, ambiguities, and 
complexities that characterize privacy choices, individuals are likely influenced 
by a number of cognitive limitations and behavioral biases.”238 
For example, the social psychology literature suggests that there is a bias 
known as the false consensus effect by which individuals overestimate their 
similarity to others including unconsciously assuming that others share one’s 
                                                                                                                           
 235 Sprenger, supra note 3.  
 236 Behavioral economics generally studies how various individual, social, cognitive, and 
emotional biases influence economic decisions. 
 237 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics to the Behavioral Economics of Privacy: 
A Note, in ETHICS AND POLICY OF BIOMETRICS 23, 24 (Ajay Kumar & David Zhang eds., 2010); 
Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY 82, 83 (2009). 
 238 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About 
Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363, 368 (Alessandro 
Acquisti et al. eds., 2007). Acquisti is largely talking about consumer privacy choices, but the logic he 
applies from the behavioral economics literature logically applies with equal force to the context of 
executives making privacy decisions within a corporation. 
1732 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1693 
thoughts and values.239 The research on the false consensus effect240 originated 
in 1931, when a study found that admitted cheaters estimated the prevalence of 
cheating at a significantly higher rate than non-cheaters did.241 Since then, the 
vast majority of hundreds of conducted studies have confirmed that individuals 
who engaged in a certain behavior, had a particular preference, struggled with 
a particular problem, or had a certain belief, assumed that others shared their 
characteristic when asked to estimate features about the general population, 
thus supporting the hypothesis that people overestimate the degree to which 
they are similar to others.242 
Organizational behavior scholars have studied the impact of this false 
consensus effect on decision making within organizations. For example, one 
recent paper found that ethical decision making in organizations is subject to the 
false consensus bias by which individuals wrongly assume that others hold the 
same opinions regarding ethics as the individual.243 Under this behavioral 
phenomenon, individuals’ own views bias their estimates of the values held by 
the general population.244 Perhaps resulting from a “desire for normative 
alignment,” individuals within an organization become “predisposed to view 
their decisions as being more in line with the prevailing view than others’ 
decisions are.”245 Additionally, the research found individuals view “alternative 
responses (particularly those directly opposed to their own) as deviant, or 
uncommon and inappropriate.”246 The authors explain that when ambiguity 
exists regarding the ethical action for the organization to pursue, individuals 
within an organization “will be inclined to see their actions as normative rather 
than deviant.”247 This effect may be exacerbated for individuals who play a 
central role in a social network because powerful individuals are less sensitive 
to the views of others.248 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Jared Williams, Financial Analysts and the False Consensus Effect, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 855, 
859 (2013) (“Ross, Greene, and House [1977] also investigated the phenomenon, and they were the 
first to use the term ‘false consensus effect’ to refer to it.”). 
 240 See generally Lee Ross et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in Social 
Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977) 
(demonstrating the false consensus effect through a number of studies). 
 241 DANIEL KATZ & FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES: A REPORT OF THE 
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY REACTION STUDY 205–35 (1931). 
 242 Williams, supra note 239, at 859–60; see also Brian Mullen et al., The False Consensus 
Effect: A Meta-Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 261–63 
(1985). 
 243 Francis J. Flynn & Scott S. Wiltermuth, Who’s With Me? False Consensus, Brokerage, and 
Ethical Decision Making in Organizations, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1074, 1075 (2010). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 1076. 
2016] Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top 1733 
Applying this research to corporate privacy decision making, it can be 
viewed as a subset of organizational ethical decision making more generally, 
and shares the characteristic that the correct privacy action for the organization 
to pursue is often ambiguous. Furthermore, corporate executives certainly play 
a central role within the social network of the corporation, and are the sources 
of power within the corporation. Consequently, this research suggests that the 
false consensus effect bias may cause corporate executives to wrongly assume 
that their various corporate constituents share the executives’ low valuation of 
privacy. This causes them to incorrectly estimate the corporate constituent’s 
views of the costs in a cost-benefit analysis of a particular corporate decision 
that may have privacy tradeoffs at stake. 
Furthermore, the psychology and behavioral economics literature also 
suggests that individuals are likely to make decisions that validate their own 
prior life decisions as the result of a few related phenomenon. When facing a 
decision that suggests that an individual’s prior life decision was incorrect, the 
individual subconsciously perceives cognitive dissonance.249 As a solution to 
the cognitive dissonance, the individual makes use of confirmation bias and 
choice-supportive bias, in which the individual interprets objective evidence in 
a way that confirms our preferences, beliefs, and prior choices.250 In this case, 
executives who have decided to trade away their own privacy, are more likely 
to conclude that others must be willing to trade away their privacy in return for 
some sort of benefit (such as the product or service the corporation is selling). 
Under this choice-supportive bias, individuals behave to retroactively justify 
their own life choices. Therefore, corporate executives who have already made 
the decision to trade-off their own personal privacy in pursuit of power, fame 
or fortune, then wrongly assume that everyone else is willing to similarly trade 
privacy in order to retroactively justify their life choices. 
 Both of these scenarios are exacerbated by the fact that, for the most part, 
neither employees nor consumers have meaningful choice when it comes to 
privacy. In other words, this supply-side explanation works hand-in-hand with 
the existing literature regarding the demand-side market failures explaining 
why corporations don’t adequately protect privacy. The privacy sorting effect 
means that corporate executives are less likely to be concerned about privacy, 
and the demand-side market failures prevent them from being held accountable 
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for that blindness. The supply-side corporate privacy market distortion and the 
demand-side consumer market failures are thus mutually reinforcing of the 
problem in that each failure permits the other to remain in the market. 
It is also worth explaining how these various cognitive phenomena would 
occur within the inner working dynamics of various types of corporations. 
First, some “privacy merchant” corporations base their entire business model 
on buying and selling consumer data, and thus in a sense are in the privacy 
business.251 These are not the corporations that are the focus of the theory of 
this Article. Privacy merchants are “bad” at privacy because it is their entire 
business model to be bad at privacy. There are no cognitive or other failures 
causing this result; they are accomplishing exactly what their business model 
intends. 
Rather, this Article is focused on explaining corporations who are actually 
in the business of selling something else: cars, dolls, services, products, but 
along the way face numerous choices to prioritize or not prioritize privacy. 
Sometimes the choice is explicit, where everyone involved knows a privacy 
decision is being made. In scenarios with a conscious privacy decision the 
cognitive biases discussed above can play an important role. Corporations 
faced with such conscious privacy decisions may decide “wrong” regarding 
their expectation of consumer privacy preferences as a result of a combination 
of those biases. For example, a corporation facing a decision whether to take 
an action that they realize will have privacy consequences may have all the 
corporate executives ask themselves what decision they themselves would 
make if they were the consumer. Because they systematically are less likely to 
care about their own privacy, when they assume that their consumers likely 
match their privacy preferences they reach a decision that leads to a privacy 
failure. There is also likely a sort of group think phenomenon in which all the 
low-privacy valuing executives mutually reinforce the belief that consumers 
would also not care about making the privacy tradeoff at issue. Finally, this is 
further exacerbated by the choice-supportive bias, in which the corporate 
executives subconsciously desire to validate their life choices in which they 
have chosen to trade away their own privacy in exchange for the various 
benefits of their position. This may explain why there are so many anecdotal 
examples of corporations announcing privacy-invading decisions only to have 
to reverse course when they face a seemingly, but surprisingly unanticipated 
privacy backlash. 
At other times, corporations may not even realize that the decision they 
are making is a privacy-implicating decision. This can occur at the top at the 
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level of the corporate leadership, or may occur further downstream as a result 
of a failure in the system design architecture.  At the level of the C-suite, 
countless high-level corporate decisions may in some way implicate privacy, 
from a decision to install GPS trackers into company vehicles to a decision to 
store consumer data on a centralized database. Many such decisions however, 
do not obviously present themselves in the form of a privacy question. Put 
differently, the decisions are not framed in terms of should the corporation take 
this privacy-invading action, or should the corporation not take this privacy-
invading action? Assume, for example that individuals, including corporate 
executives, who place a low value on privacy are not particularly concerned 
about GPS tracking, and in fact to use Westin’s terminology, don’t understand 
what the fuss is all about.252 Therefore, in reaching a decision about installing 
GPS trackers, the conversation may focus on the financial costs, the efficiency 
costs, etc., but may not ever discuss the privacy costs to the employees because 
it doesn’t reach their consciousness. A similar phenomenon can occur multiple 
times every day as corporations are faced with numerous seemingly innocent 
decisions that can have significant privacy consequences. 
Other unintentional privacy decisions can take place further downstream 
within the corporate decision-making hierarchy, yet even these downstream 
decisions can be impacted by the privacy preferences of corporate executives. 
These downstream choices are what Harvard computer scientist Latanya 
Sweeney refers to as random design decisions.253 A computer scientist or other 
engineer can design a product in a number of different ways in order to achieve 
many of the functional purposes of the product. To simplify, assume that one 
way of making a particular product is better for privacy, and a second way is 
worse for privacy. For example, a fitness wearable device could be designed in 
such a way that the individual’s personal data is stored entirely on the user’s 
own device (the Apple Watch), or it could be designed in such a way that the 
individual’s personal data is stored on a centralized server (Fitbit). Similarly, a 
camcorder video camera can be designed with a mute button, or without a 
mute button. Corporations face countless such design decisions all the time. 
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The low-privacy preferences of corporate executives can impact such 
downstream arbitrary design decisions in a number of different ways. First, at 
some corporations, often tech companies and former start-ups, there is a large 
cult of personality surrounding top corporate executives. Programmers and 
engineers are aware of the personality of the corporate executive, and in turn, 
without being explicitly told to do so, will make their various design decisions 
consistent with what they believe the executives would prefer. If, then, it is 
known within the corporation that the executives do not place a high priority or 
valuation on privacy, and don’t really seem to understand why people care 
about privacy, then the engineers and computer scientists254 will in turn make 
design decisions consistent with these presumed preference by the executives. 
At other corporations, the issue may be one of software or process design 
architecture. Under such process design architecture, the corporate leadership 
is supposed to provide primary requirements and specifications for a product. 
For example, leadership can ask employees to design a watch that can be used 
to track employees’ steps, and can also ask that it be made as quickly and 
cheaply as possible using the following specifications of size, weight, battery 
life, etc. If that design architecture fails to include any specifications regarding 
privacy, a likely result in the face of the low privacy preferences of corporate 
executives, then programmers or engineers are empowered to make arbitrary 
decisions that do not take into account privacy. This can be fixed by including 
privacy within the process design architecture, using what scholars have called 
“privacy by design,”255 however, low-privacy valuing corporate executives are 
unlikely to recognize the need to do so. To really implement privacy by design, 
not only engineers making the design decisions need to be on board, but the 
corporate leadership must also prioritize “privacy by design” as part of the 
corporate culture. 
III. RESTORING CORPORATE PRIVACY 
If there is a sorting phenomenon keeping individuals who place a high 
value on privacy out of corporate leadership, and if that sorting phenomenon is 
having a negative impact on corporate privacy decision making, then what can 
be done to counter that phenomenon? 
Existing proposals for addressing systematic corporate privacy failures 
have focused on demand-side solutions both in terms of non-governmental 
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ways to address market failures, as well as legal interventions to protect the 
privacy of corporate constituents. These solutions will help to the extent that, 
as previously discussed, the demand-side issues exacerbate the problem by 
preventing corporations from being held accountable when they behave badly 
regarding privacy.256  
In addition, however, if, as this Article theorizes, there is also a supply-
side corporate privacy market distortion that is contributing to the problem, 
then supply-side reforms may offer an additional avenue for change. The rest 
of this Part offers two possible examples of such corporation-side reforms: one 
aimed at minimizing the sorting itself, and the second aimed at minimizing the 
impact of any sorting that occurs on corporate decision making.257 First, to 
help combat the privacy sorting phenomenon itself, corporate disclosure laws 
could be modified to permit corporate executives to negotiate individualized 
personal disclosure policies, which would in turn be disclosed to shareholders. 
Second, in order to combat the impact of the privacy sorting on corporations, 
corporations could continue the trend of adopting CPOs as a necessary part of 
good corporate governance, in order to ensure that there is someone in the C-
suite whose job it is to raise privacy concerns when making decisions. 
A. Allow Executives to Negotiate Personal Disclosure Policies 
As explained above, part of the structural problem that causes the privacy 
sorting phenomenon is that potential corporate executives are unsure whether 
various types of their personal information would need to be disclosed to 
shareholders. In light of this uncertainty, individuals who deeply value privacy 
may choose to pursue other business positions that would provide them more 
certainty in their ability to guard their own privacy. The simplest solution for 
this situation would be for the SEC to clarify that corporate executives do not 
need to disclose their personal information to shareholders. This is unlikely to 
occur, and potentially undesirable because counterbalancing the executives’ 
privacy interest is a legitimate disclosure interest on the part of shareholders.258 
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Therefore, the best way to satisfy the shareholders’ disclosure interest 
while allowing potential corporate executives to guard their privacy is to make 
a more minor change in the law to permit a two-step process: (1) mandatory 
contracting between the corporate executive and the corporation regarding the 
plan for the corporation’s disclosures of the executive’s personal information, 
combined with (2) mandatory disclosure of the negotiated disclosure plan to 
the shareholders.259 
Under the first step, the law would be changed to not only permit, but also 
require corporate executives to negotiate their own personal disclosure policies 
when they are hired or promoted to their high-level position. Therefore the 
change would replace the strict traditional mandatory disclosure regime, which 
does not permit those executives with higher privacy preferences to negotiate 
to protect those preferences, with a mandatory contracting regime that allows 
executives with heterogeneous preferences to contract in a way consistent with 
those preferences. Under this contracting regime, high-level executives would 
contract with the corporation to determine the privacy disclosure policy that 
would apply to that executive’s personal information in light of that 
executive’s privacy preferences. This would allow potential executives who 
care about privacy to negotiate a disclosure policy that could adequately 
protect their privacy by treating privacy as one aspect of the overall 
compensation package that can be prioritized or traded off for other 
considerations.260 The efficiency of the contracting regime could be facilitated 
by the creation of a menu of possible disclosure options, from which the 
parties could choose.261 
Once the executive and corporation agree to a disclosure policy for that 
executive’s personal information, the law would mandate the corporation to 
disclose the negotiated disclosure policy to the shareholders, in order to protect 
and balance the shareholder interest in disclosure of relevant information. In 
other words, the corporation would disclose to shareholders whether or not it 
would in the future be disclosing personal information about a particular high-
level executive to the shareholders, thus allowing shareholders to decide 
whether, and how much they value that information. 
For example, assume a high-level executive and a corporation bargain for 
a privacy policy from among the menu of choices that is fairly protective of 
privacy. The policy may say, perhaps, that the corporation will not disclose 
personal information about the executive unless it is currently substantially 
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impacting his or her ability to do his or her job, and even then the corporation 
will only disclose the fact of the impairment, not the underlying personal facts. 
The corporation would then be required to disclose this disclosure policy to the 
shareholders. If shareholders do not find this level of disclosure adequate, then 
the market can respond accordingly, and protection of privacy can be factored 
in to market forces, just like increased salaries, or any compensation feature 
desired by executives. The menu approach would help facilitate the usability of 
this system, as implementing a standard format and common vocabulary across 
disclosure policies would allow shareholders to directly compare disclosure 
policies. It could also be designed to be relatively straightforward, rather than 
taking the form of the lengthy legalese privacy policies that consumers are 
given and ignore all the time. This would help solve the sorting problem by 
increasing the likelihood that individuals who value privacy would consider 
pursuing corporate executive positions. 
B. Make Chief Privacy Officers Part of Good Corporate Governance 
The solution above may reduce the corporate privacy sorting problem, but 
it cannot remove it entirely. This is because the disclosure requirements are 
only one of the ways in which the privacy of executives is compromised in 
addition to the role of the public and media in wanting and providing personal 
information about corporate executives.262 Thus any solution that aims to 
restore functional supply-side corporate decision making with regard to 
privacy must also target the impact of the remaining sorting problem. One way 
to counter the sorting phenomenon is for corporations to be encouraged to take 
steps to make sure that the privacy-valuing perspective is actually represented 
in the corporate boardroom. 
This lends additional support to those who have already spoken about the 
positive benefits of CPOs within the corporate structure. One of the best ways 
to make sure the privacy perspective is heard is to make the existence of a 
CPO a defined part of good corporate governance practices. As Peter Swire 
opined based on his prior experience as essentially the CPO for the Federal 
government: 
I believe having a person visibly responsible for privacy is a helpful 
way to ensure that privacy issues are considered in the organization’s 
actions. Privacy concerns may or may not win out in the eventual 
decisions, but having a person expert in privacy in the process means 
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that the other participants at least have to articulate why the proposed 
actions are consistent with the organization’s announced privacy 
policies.263  
Swire’s insight becomes even more important if there are reasons to believe 
that the rest of the C-suite is disproportionately unlikely to adequately consider 
or value privacy issues. 
CPOs already exist at many corporations for a variety of reasons. In the 
early 1990s a number of industries such as telecom, health, and information 
technology began facing great risks with data collection and processing.264 
These industries began assigning employees the task of managing privacy.265 
By the mid-1990s, Jennifer Glasgow at Acxiom made the shift from the leader 
of the company’s privacy efforts, to officially holding the title of CPO.266 
Other companies created similar positions during the 1990s.267 Often, the 
creation of high-level corporate privacy positions was triggered by a crisis, 
which required the corporation to convince skittish consumers that 
corporations were not “a lot of evil-headed monsters.”268 For example, in 
response to some trouble DoubleClick announced in 2000 that they were going 
to create a CPO role.269 At the time, Crain’s New York Business mocked the 
CPO title and predicted its demise.270 Instead, in November 2000, Harriet 
Pearson became the first CPO of a Fortune 100 Company,271 and by 2001, the 
New York Times reported that CPOs had become increasingly common in the 
C-suite with over one hundred such positions in the United States.272 
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In addition to various privacy crises triggering the creation of a CPO role, 
the other leading factor in the rise of the prevalence of the CPO originated in 
Europe.273 In 1995, the EU Data Privacy Directive attempted to implement 
common multinational data security law across the European Union.274 U.S. 
companies began to address this law, which limited data from leaving Europe 
unless the importing country had “adequate” protections in place.275 Because 
Europe considered the American data privacy protections inadequate under 
European standards, American companies needed to figure out a way to obtain 
important data for their companies.276 The resulting complexity drove the rise 
of CPOs.277 
Other factors may also have played contributing roles in the rise of the 
CPO. According to Swire, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLB”), a 
financial privacy law, also played an underappreciated role in the rise of the 
CPO.278 Swire argues that the privacy notice requirements of the GLB coupled 
with liability for violating those privacy notices required a larger compliance 
effort than has been recognized, and that resulted in the number of CPOs rising 
rapidly in the aftermath of the GLB.279 Additionally, Andrea Matwyshyn 
points out that for industries involving health data privacy, under HIPAA, 
covered entities must designate a privacy official to be responsible for 
developing and implementing the entity’s policies and procedures.280 Others 
have suggested that the rise of the FTC privacy enforcement and the 
corresponding threat of FTC oversight inspired some corporations to hire a 
privacy officer,281 and led to increased corporate reliance on professional 
privacy management.282 
Regardless of the varied motivations for the rise of the CPO thus far, the 
theory developed in this Article supports the benefits of the continued rise and 
entrenchment of the CPO in corporate governance. Bamberger and Mulligan 
have studied how corporations actually manage privacy and what motivates 
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them.283 Specifically, they studied the corporate attitudes and practices of those 
corporations who had been identified as industry leaders with regard to privacy 
based on interviews with the CPOs of those leading companies.284 Despite the 
admitted limitations of their methodology, at the very least their results are 
consistent with the idea that having a CPO within the corporate boardroom can 
compensate for the lack of privacy issue spotting that might otherwise occur. 
Consistent with what this Article would predict, their study found that those 
corporations identified within the industry as having the best privacy practices 
involved a CPO who was able to get onto the corporate board’s agenda, who 
had high status within the corporation as a privacy leader, and who was able to 
managerialize and institutionalize privacy as part of privacy by design.285 The 
CPOs within the Bamberger and Mulligan study,286 expressed a consistent 
theme that suggested their role in pushing privacy policies to the forefront of 
strategy within the corporation and being proactive and predictive. One such 
CPO pointed out that the ambiguity inherent in privacy regulation as a highly 
evolving area, means the CPOs’ role consists of “[l]ooking around corners . . . 
looking forward to things that are a few years out.”287 Another CPO explained, 
“Customer expectations change and the employee expectations change. The 
world changes periodically too on top of that and I look at what we’re doing as 
something that’s really important from any kind of a personal and values 
perspective and from a business perspective.”288 A third CPO explained that 
the focus is on “the next thing that’s coming down the pike, because if you get 
caught unawares, you’re behind the ball and you’re spending a lot of 
money.”289 In the absence of clear rules and industry standards, which would 
be very difficult given how quickly privacy norms can change, for a 
corporation to be proactive and predictive on issues of privacy requires an 
individual in the corporate boardroom responsible for thinking about and 
raising these privacy issues. This theory offered by this Article suggests that 
the traditional C-suite would not be able to foresee these issues themselves. 
The benefits of having CPOs as a matter of good corporate governance to 
offset the privacy indifference of corporate executives more generally increase 
with the rise of a professionalized privacy-officer community. To the extent 
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that CPOs face struggles in the C-suite with other corporate executives who 
either don’t recognize the privacy issue, or don’t understand its importance, 
they are able to network with other professionals within the privacy-officer 
community to increase traction. CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s studies 
reported that information obtained from peers provided leverage as they 
advocate for certain privacy practices within their own firms.290 At times they 
even reported being brought in to communicate with other corporations to help 
convince a reluctant executive committee about the benefits of a particular 
privacy initiative.291 One CPO recalled the following: 
I’ve been on the phone with [other firms’] executive committees, 
telling them about [our company’s] experience because it helps the 
other company[’s] privacy office to have me tell their people 
because they’ve told them and they don’t believe them. So when 
they hear it directly from me, that has some advantage and I’ve done 
that with a number of different companies.292 
Interestingly, the CPOs did not view privacy as a competitive feature upon 
which corporations can distinguish themselves to obtain an advantage in the 
market.293 Rather, they viewed privacy as having a network effect by which a 
competitor’s privacy mistake risked tarnishing the industry and a competitor’s 
privacy successes add value to an entire industry that exceed the competitive 
advantage to any particular firm.294 Consequently privacy professionals were 
willing to freely share information about privacy policies and practices.295 
Reasonable minds can disagree precisely how to increase and continue to 
promote the rise of CPOs. One possibility is merely to promote the CPO as a 
matter of good corporate governance. Alternatively, it is possible to use more 
coercive and governmentally mandated mechanisms. Regardless of which 
mechanism is used, the corporate-market distortion theory offers good reason 
to believe that consistent with the evidence obtained thus far, the increased use 
of CPOs who are well integrated into a corporation and with the actual power 
to raise privacy concerns will help offset some of the corporate privacy failures 
that occur as the result of the privacy sorting phenomenon. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article presents an additional theory for corporate privacy failures 
that focuses on market distortions within the corporation itself starting at the 
very top with the CEO and other members of the C-suite. This theory is meant 
to complement rather than replace the theories offered by the existing literature 
that exclusively focus on demand-side market failures. Admittedly, the theory 
offered in this Article is purely theoretical. The Article has described a possible 
theory and presented reasons drawn from the privacy, behavioral psychology, 
and economic literatures that suggest reasons that such a theory may help offer 
a more complete explanation for corporate privacy behavior. In future work, it 
is possible to collaborate with empirical scholars to better test aspects of this 
theory. 
One imperfect, but plausible option to test the privacy sorting aspect of 
the theory would be to conduct surveys of top business school students asking 
them both about their career goals and previously established questions to help 
determine their privacy preferences. If the privacy sorting theory is correct, 
then such a study should be consistent with a hypothesis that business school 
students who care about privacy are less likely to aspire for positions in the C-
suite of publicly traded companies, and instead plan to pursue other fields such 
as banking, management consulting, and hedge funds. Although not a perfect 
measure, this might be a more feasible project in lieu of the unlikely strategy 
of trying to get corporate executives to respond to surveys in a reliable fashion. 
Another possibility would be to look at publicly available indicators of 
the privacy preferences of corporate executives. This could include the 
publicly available social media presence of corporate executives prior to the 
time that they became corporate executives. By looking closely at whether the 
corporate executive had a social media account such as Facebook, whether that 
account is limited to friends or is viewable by the public, and the degree to 
which the executive shares personal information on their social media account, 
it may be possible to get a rough sense of the privacy preferences of corporate 
executives. Partners at management consulting firms, banking companies, and 
hedge funds might be used as a baseline of comparison to determine how 
corporate executives compare with other high-level jobs with regard to social 
media. Other indicators might include considerations such as whether the 
executives wrote an autobiography, the number of images that come up in a 
Google search that are personal in nature, whether the executive has invited the 
public into their personal lives in any way, such as with a popular media 
interview, etc. 
Of course, there are likely other ways to test aspects of the theory, and 
any efforts by others to do so are encouraged as proof of the validity of the 
hypothesis will help inform various policies and legal debates regarding how 
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to treat privacy in our society. Most importantly, if the corporate-side privacy 
market distortion theory is correct, then consumer-side solutions will not alone 
suffice to fix the corporate privacy problem. Solutions must also tackle the 
lack of privacy in the C-suite. 
  
 
 
